Some theories of associative learning imply that time plays a fundamental role in the acquisition process. Consistent with these theories, this paper presents evidence that the time from the onset of a conditioned stimulus (CS) until presentation of the unconditioned stimulus (US) is learned very rapidly at the start of training. We report two autoshaping studies and a study on aversive conditioning in goldfish in which we examine timing at the start of conditioning. We also review data from a number of other conditioning preparations, including fear-potentiated startle, appetitive conditioning in rats, and eyeblink conditioning in rabbits, that report conditioned response (CR) timing early in training. Acquisition speed and the very first expressions of conditioned responding often show sensitivity to the time of US presentation. In instances where temporal control is slowly expressed, it is likely due to performance factors, not to slow learning about time. In fact, the learning about time may be a necessary condition for associative learning. 
One of John Gibbon's favorite invited colloquium titles was ''Timing is everything.'' The articles in this volume are a testimony to that title and John's conviction that understanding time would be the key to understanding learning, decision making, and memory. One of the specific areas that captured John's attention was associative learning. Over the past 20 years he made two attempts to understand how time plays a role in associative learning. In this domain, as in others, the consideration of how time is involved has led to new understanding of these processes. In general, he and his collaborators (Gallistel & Gibbon, 2000; Gibbon & Balsam, 1981) argued that the appreciation of event durations is at the core of learning processes. The purpose of this paper is to present some data and modeling that bear on exactly how and when this appreciation of time enters into the learning process.
TIME AND CONDITIONING
In the Gibbon and Balsam (1981) view, the role of time is to determine the asymptote of conditioning. Pairings of the CS and US cause associative value to grow to an asymptote that is determined by the value of the reward divided by the delay to reinforcement. Associations are formed between the CS and the US and between contextual or background cues and the US. The asymptotic associative value for the CS in delay conditioning (the CS remains on until the US is presented) is the value of the reward (H ) divided by the duration of the CS (T ). The asymptote for the background is H divided by the time between rewards, the cycle time (C ). In this view, acquisition speed is determined by a ratio comparison of the two associative values [(H/T)] / (H/C )] ϭ C/T, and this prediction was confirmed by data relating acquisition speed in autoshaping to these temporal parameters (Gibbon and Balsam, 1981) . The implication of this view is that from the very start of the acquisition process, subjects learn about specific temporal intervals signaled by stimuli. Immediate apprehension of the specific intervals is necessary to set the appropriate asymptotes.
Nevertheless, Gibbon and Balsam argued that early in training, information about specific temporal intervals (CS-US and US-US) is not part of the learned associations. The average times set an asymptote, but associative value accrues to the context and CS, not to specific times within the context and CS. In other words, associative value is distributed evenly over the CS and US, and, as a result, the comparison between the associative value of the trial and the associative value of the background that determines response strength is not sensitive to the point in the cycle or trial at which the comparison is made. This explanation was put forth to account for two observations. First, acquisition criteria are reached at the same time when animals are trained with either fixed-duration or variable-duration cycle times (Gibbon, Baldock, Locurto, Gold, & Terrace, 1977) . If the C/T comparison were sensitive to the point at which the comparison is made, one would expect retarded acquisition with fixed C's because fixed C's would produce greater expectancy at the end of the cycle (where the C/T comparison is made) as compared to variable ones, which would have expectancy distributed more evenly throughout a cycle. The second observation was that early in training responding occurs relatively uniformly throughout the CS, but with extended training responding becomes unlikely at the onset of the cue and more likely as the expected time of the US approaches. This change in responding is sometimes termed inhibition of delay after Pavlov's (1927) analysis of the change in temporal generalization gradients during salivary conditioning.
This pattern of responding is depicted in Fig. 1 for an autoshaping experiment with pigeons. Two groups of subjects received 30 pairings of a keylight with grain in each of 12 daily sessions. The time between feeder presentations averaged 96 s. One group of subjects had an 8-s CS and the other group had a 16-s CS. The top panel of the figure shows the number of pairings until subjects reached their fifth trial with a peck. The subjects with the briefer CS met this criterion significantly faster than did the subjects with the longer CS, t(10) ϭ 2.05, p Ͻ .05. The middle panel shows the distribution of responding during trials early and late in training. In autoshaping experiments the bird is usually not in front of the keylight at the onset of a trial. Therefore the minimum latency to peck is usually 1-1.5 s. Consequently, response rate at the start of a trial reflects both the tendency to respond and the proximity of the bird to the keylight. The low responding in the initial bin should not be taken as strong evidence for temporal discrimination. Notice that by the end of training there is good temporal discrimination at both intervals.
The Gibbon and Balsam model is thus in the awkward position of stating, on the one hand, that animals apprehend, from the beginning of training, the precise values of C and T and, on the other hand, that they do not use these values to modulate their within-trial pattern of responding or to more precisely distribute expectancy. The Gallistel and Gibbon (2000) model provides an elegant resolution to this dilemma. In their model, subjects accumulate time in the presence of the CS and accumulate time in the intertrial interval (ITI) across trials. USs are also accumulated and attributed to either the CS or the background. When the estimated rate of reward in the presence of the CS (λ T ) exceeds the overall rate of reward [rate in the background alone (λ B ) ϩ CS rate (λ T )] in a ratio comparison [λ T / (λ T ϩ λ B )] by a large enough amount, subjects will respond. In this theory, acquisition speed also depends on the ratio of CS time to cycle time. However, this occurs because acquisition explicitly depends on a comparison of rates of reinforcementnot on the learning of specific intervals.
Recently we have turned our attention to the issue of when information about specific intervals is acquired. Clearly it is acquired at some point (see Arcediano & Miller, this issue) , and we believe this point is sooner rather than later. In the paragraphs below, we consider evidence from several different conditioning preparations strongly suggesting that specific temporal intervals are encoded from the very start of a learning experience. We first turn again to acquisition of autoshaping.
LEARNING ABOUT SPECIFIC INTERVALS
The initial flat response gradients seen within trials (Gibbon, Farrell, Locurto, Duncan, & Terrace, 1980) would seem to indicate that subjects do not discriminate their local temporal position in the trial. This could occur for two reasons. It is possible that subjects only appreciate the average delays signaled by the CS (Gibbon & Balsam, 1981) or average rates of reward (Gallistel & Gibbon, 2000) . Alternatively, they may know the specific time but have a low threshold for responding, making it appear that the CS time is not learned. If the latter is true, then we might be able to detect the temporal knowledge in other ways. For example, perhaps the latency to the first peck in a trial reflects the specific temporal knowledge even though subsequent responding during the trial does not. The bottom panel of Fig. 1 shows the average latency to respond on the first five trials with a response. The latency for the 16-s group is around twice that of the 8-s group, t(10) ϭ 5.87, p Ͻ .01. One needs to be cautious in looking at latencies. If there was stronger conditioning in one group than the other, then latency differences may merely reflect differences in associative strength. In our experiment, conditioning may be stronger with the 8-s CS than with the 16-s CS. However, the data presented in the figure are taken from identical points in the acquisition process for the two groups. Presumably, the fifth trial with a peck occurs in each group at approximately the same associative strength although subjects in the different groups have had very different amounts of exposure to the CS. Overall, these data suggest that subjects may indeed have learned the specific delays to reward associated with the CS.
We collected more conclusive data about latencies to cues of different durations in a subsequent autoshaping experiment with ring doves. Two groups of six subjects were trained with either an 8-or a 16-s CS. They all received 16 pairings in each of 20 daily sessions. The cycle time for the 8-s group was 72 s but the cycle time for the 16-s group was 144 s. In both groups, the C/T ratio was 9. As expected, acquisition occurred at about the same rate in both groups. The top panel of Fig. 2 shows the average number of pairings until the fifth trial with a response. There was no significant difference between the groups, t(10) ϭ 1.04, p ϭ .32. This provides us with the opportunity to examine latencies in groups trained with different CS durations with equivalent amounts of training. The bottom panel shows the average latencies on the first five trials with a peck. Again, the latency in the 16-s group is almost twice as long as the latency of the 8-s group, t(10) ϭ 5.04, p Ͻ .01. In this experiment, latency differences cannot be attributed to differences in the strength of conditioning or to differences in the amount of training. However, there is still an interpretation of the data that does not depend on timing of specific intervals. Imagine that responses are induced by a random process with a constant probability in any given unit of time. Necessarily, a longer CS will allow for longer latencies to occur and the averages will be longer for the longer duration cue. If this were the case then the early parts of the latency distributions would be identical for all cues no matter what their duration. However, that is not the case in our data. An analyses of the latency to peck on the first five trials yielded a total of 30 latency scores for each group (6 subjects per group). In the 8-s group, 70% of the latencies were less than 4 s, but, in the 16-s group, only 27% of the latencies were less than 4 s and this difference was a significant one [χ 2 (1) ϭ 11.3, p Ͻ .01]. The data from both of these autoshaping experiments strongly suggest that specific durations of the CS are appreciated very early in training and that there is sensitivity to specific cue duration before CRs are strongly modulated by elapsing time in a cue. Early apprehension of specific durations has also been demonstrated in rat appetitive conditioning (Kirkpatrick & Church, 2000) . Rats were given tone-food pairings at various C/T ratios (varied between groups). The dependent measure was the number of head insertions into the food hopper. To determine whether conditioned responding emerged before timing of response output, Kirkpatrick and Church computed ''stimulus'' and ''timing'' discrimination ratios (DRs) by comparing response rates during four temporal windows, each with duration equal to 0.13T. Conditioned responding was assessed by the stimulus DR, which compared rates during the stimulus window, centered on the middle of T, with rates during the ITI window, centered on the middle of the ITI. The timing DR compared response rates at the end of the CS to rates at the start of the CS. Both DRs increased as a function of pairings. They computed the number of pairings before there was a large increase in DR and found that both ratios increased at about the same point in training. It appears that temporal discrimination occurs around the same time there is detectable conditioning.
Perhaps the best evidence for early apprehension of specific durations comes from the aversive conditioning literature, wherein rats have been shown to exhibit temporal gradients of responding after just a few learning trials. Davis, Schlesinger, and Sorenson (1989) demonstrate rapid development of temporal control by studying the effects of different light-shock intervals on fear-potentiated startle. Rats were given either 1, 2, 5 or 30 training trials and then were tested for fear-potentiated startle at various test intervals. After just one light-shock pairing at a 51.2-s ISI, rats showed a clear temporal gradient in startle amplitude, with amplitude increasing monotonically as the test interval increased from 0.1 to 51.2 s (the longest test interval used). With shorter training ISIs (200 and 3200 ms), conditioning took two trials to emerge. Nevertheless, after two training trials, startle amplitude showed a clear temporal gradient, with peak amplitude occurring near the training ISI value.
We have obtained more detailed evidence about the speed of temporal learning in aversive conditioning in some studies conducted with M.E. Bitterman and P.A. Couvillon at the University of Hawaii. We (Drew, Cooke, Zupan, Couvillon, Bitterman, & Balsam, in preparation) studied aversive conditioning in goldfish (Carassius auratus) using a Pavlovian version of the peak procedure. In a peak procedure, subjects are trained on a fixed delay from the onset of the CS until the US is presented. On occasional probe trials, no US is presented and the CS stays on past the expected time of the US. Temporal generalization gradients can be obtained on these probe trials. One objective in conducting our experiment was to study in more detail the changes in timing of the conditioned response that occur with training. Specifically, we wanted to determine whether acquisition is characterized mainly by changes in the peak height of the CR, or rather by more fundamental changes in CR timing, such as changes in peak location, sensitivity to time, or thresholds to start and stop responding.
The experiment was conducted using conditioning tanks similar to those described by Bitterman (1964) . Each tank held one fish and contained a stimulus lamp, a pair of electrodes for delivering shock, and a sensor that gauged movement of the tank water. Fish (N ϭ 18) were given 20 daily conditioning sessions. Each session consisted of 20 trials in which a 0.25-s, 2.5-V shock followed the illumination of the stimulus lamp by 15-s. In each session, there were also three 45-s peak trials. Intertrial intervals were 2 min in duration. The dependent measure was activity, as measured by the movement sensors, which produced pulse output in response to movement of the tank water. Figure 3 shows peak trial responding as a function of training session (collapsed into four blocks of five sessions each). Two things are apparent from this graph. First, there is temporal control of conditioned responding, as evidenced by the temporal modulation of response rates and the fact that peak location occurs around the expected time of the US. Second, acquisition of conditioned responding is characterized by a progressive increase in peak height, but, once a peak emerges, there do not appear to be any consistent changes in peak location.
To test whether the timing of conditioned responding changes during acquisition, data from the first and last blocks of five sessions were normalized by maximum response rate; that is, each point was expressed as a proportion of the maximum response rate for the corresponding block of trials. The resulting distributions are shown in Fig. 4 . Superposition is poor. However, because these graphs include all trials, it is not clear whether the flat gradient for sessions 1-5 reflects a lack of timing or a lack of conditioning (or both). To address this issue, we looked at data samples taken at a constant number of sessions after the acquisition of conditioning. To determine the acquisition point, we compared responding during the first 15 s of each peak trial to the baseline response rate for the corresponding session. Baseline rates were computed from ''blank trials,'' which consisted of a 15-s period in which no CS was presented. The acquisition criterion was that the response rate on two of three consecutive peak trials exceed the baseline rate by a factor of 3. Postacquisition data were then collapsed into blocks of three trials each. Only blocks containing data from at least 13 subjects (Blocks 1-12) were used in the following analyses. Figure 5 shows normalized distributions for the first and 12th block of three trials post-acquisition. Differences in the shape of the distributions remain. Indeed, a 2 (Block) ϫ 45 (Bin) ANOVA revealed a significant Block ϫ Bin interaction, F(44, 528) ϭ 10.49, p Ͻ .01.
To understand in more detail the basis for the change in the timing of the conditioned response with training, we fit post-acquisition data to the model
FIG. 4.
The mean level of normalized activity is shown as a function of time within a probe trial. The data are normalized with respect to each subject's peak rate. The rate in each bin was divided by the maximum rate. Subjects were trained with a 15-s CS duration. Each curve represents the average of all probe trials in five consecutive sessions (three probe trials per session).
FIG. 5.
The mean level of normalized activity is shown as a function of time within a probe trial. The data are normalized with respect to each subject's peak rate. The rate in each bin was divided by the maximum rate. One line represents the first three probe trials after each subject met an acquisition criterion (see text). The other line represents each subject's last three probe trials. described in Table 1 . The data were curves for individual subjects obtained by taking a mean across three consecutive (post-acquisition) peak trials. As in the above analysis, only the first 12 three-trial blocks after acquisition were used. The model is based on the observation that, on individual trials, conditioned responding often conforms to a low-high-low pattern of response rates with abrupt changes between states (often called a break-runbreak pattern; Church, Meck, & Gibbon, 1994) . At the start of the trial, there is a low rate of responding (LR 1 ), which eventually gives way to a high local rate (HR) sometime before T, the programmed time of US presentation. The high rate is followed by a switch to a second low rate (LR 2 ) sometime after T has elapsed. The model contained parameters (coefficients) representing the expected time of reinforcement (S), threshold for transitioning between low and high response rates [(1 Ϫ β 1 )S; (1 ϩ β 2 )S], sensitivity to time (1/γ), and response rates (LR 1 , HR, LR 2 ). The data were fit using an iterative algorithm that maximized ω 2 , a measure of the amount of variance in the data accounted for by the model.
The mean best-fitting parameter values are shown in Fig. 6 . To test for changes in these values as a function of trials, the parameters were subjected individually to one-way ANOVAs. The results are shown in Table 2 . The only significant effect of Trial Block was on the HR parameter. The HR parameter increased linearly as a function of training as indicated by a significant linear trend, F(1,12) ϭ 20.95, p Ͻ .001. A hedge factor used to determine how long before S to transition from a low to high response rate. β 2 A hedge factor used to determine how long after S to transition from a high to a low response rate. LR 1 Initial low response rate HR High response rate LR 2 Second low response rate Computational formulas
Note. R t , response rate at time t; Φ is the normal distribution function. The crucial outcomes of the modeling were that only the HR changed with training. The other parameters in the model remained static. The results confirm our initial inference that acquisition of conditioned responding is characterized by increases in peak height without significant changes in peak time. It should be noted that the percentage of variance accounted for by the model (ω 2 ) increased over blocks. For ω 2 , both the quadratic and 5th-order trends reached significance, Fs (1, 12) ϭ 5.26, 12.85, p Ͻ .05. Nevertheless, ω 2 increased over trials; the values for block 1 and block 12 differed significantly, t(12) ϭ 2.58, p ϭ .02. The increase in ω 2 is likely due to the increase in peak height relative to the background (''noise'') level of responding. With training, the peak height increases, and, as a result, the relative amount of variability in the data attributed to the noisy background rate decreases. The stability of the sensitivity (γ) and threshold (β 1 , β 2 ) parameters suggests that the strength and sensitivity of temporal control is constant. The stability of S is consistent with the idea that the expected time of reward is constant throughout training.
More generally, the modeling suggests that flat temporal generalization gradients do not necessarily reflect an insensitivity to time, a lack of specific knowledge about the expected time of the US, or a lack of knowledge of the moment-to-moment temporal location in a trial. Rather, the sharpening of gradients during training appears to be due to the increase in the peak rate during conditioning. As the CR comes to represent a larger percentage of the overall response output, the gradients sharpen.
CONCLUSION
Overall, specific times are learned very rapidly from the start of training. Though temporal generalization gradients sometimes develop slowly it appears that the knowledge about specific delays to reward is acquired rapidly. As our data with goldfish indicate, when temporal control of responding appears to develop slowly, at least some of the time it is an artifact of averaging trials with CRs with trials without CRs. Additionally, in preparations in which there is a nonzero baseline level of the CR, timing will appear to sharpen during training as the background level of responding becomes a smaller proportion of the total response output. In these cases there appears to be no need to assume that the early portions of a CS become inhibitory.
The preponderance of evidence currently available supports the conclusion that time is encoded and used from the very beginning of conditioning. The latency of early CRs, early temporal generalization gradients, and the effects of time on acquisition speed all support the hypothesis that temporal knowledge is an integral part of learning from the start of training. In fact, two lines of work argue that specific times of US presentation are learned prior to any expression of the CR. First, as mentioned earlier, the effect of temporal parameters on acquisition speed argue that temporal knowledge modulates learning from the very beginning of training. Second, Ohyama and Mauk (2001) have presented evidence that specific temporal intervals are learned prior to CR expression. In one of their experiments rabbits were given pairings of a tone with periorbital shock at a 750-ms ISI. They stopped training after 30 pairings, before the CS evoked a CR. Next the subjects were conditioned with a 250-ms tone CS and were trained until a strong CR was established. When subjects were tested on long probe trials (1250 ms), blinks occurred at both the short and long times since probe onset. Thus the initial ISI had been learned even though the CR had not yet been performed.
The learning of specific times may not only occur at the start of training but may actually be a necessary precursor for the learning to occur. In the Gibbon and Balsam (1981) formulation, the times must be learned to set appropriate asymptotes. In this and all linear operator models, no learning can occur until an asymptote is set. There is also some physiological evidence that the brain areas that are essential for timing may also be essential for initial learning (Medina & Mauk, 1999) . In eyeblink conditioning, the CR occurs around the expected time of the US. The cerebellar cortex must be intact for CRs to be timed (Perrett, Ruiz, & Mauk, 1993; Perrett & Mauk, 1995; Garcia & Mauk, 1998; Garcia, Steele, & Mauk, 1999; Medina, Garcia, Nores, Taylor, & Mauk, 2000) . Post-acquisition, a lesion of this area results in short-latency CRs that are not related to the original training ISI. Interestingly, if this area is lesioned prior to acquisition, then CRs never develop, not even short-latency responses (J. F. Medina, K. S. Garcia, and M. D. Mauk, as described in Ohyama & Mauk, 2001 ). This suggests that temporal information processing may play a permissive role for the formation of associations as implied by the Gibbon and Balsam view.
The idea that time plays a temporary permissive role in the formation of associations implies that after acquisition there may be some independence in the determinants of the probability of a response and the determinants of response timing. The goldfish data presented above illustrate this independence. As CR probability increases, the time of peak responding remains in-variant. This is also true during extinction. In autoshaping, as the peak height declines during extinction, the peak location does not change (Ohyama, Deich, Gibbon, & Balsam, 1998) . Thus, the factors determining when to respond may be idependent of those determining whether to respond at all.
In sum, it appears that in Pavlovian conditioning cues are timed from the outset of training. The times that are learned affect both the speed with which responding emerges and the timing of the responses during a CS. However, once a CR is established, its probability can be altered without changing its timing (Drew et al., 2001; Ohyama et al., 1998) , and its timing can be altered without changing its probability (Perrett et al., 1993; Medina et al., 2000) . This should not be taken to mean that time is not important in modulating maintained response probability. It may mean that different temporal comparisons are involved in the decision about when to respond and whether or not to respond at all (Gallistel & Gibbon, 2000) . Perhaps ''Timing is everything.''
